CDS spreads are often seen as the 'leading' market based, default risk measure. There is no popular alternative to CDS spreads except perhaps for the distance-to-default (D2D) measure based on Merton (1974) , which comes very close to it. In this paper, we investigate the correlation and short-term dynamics between these two measures for large European banks with a data panel spanning from 1/2006 to 12/2013. The analysis makes use of conventional Granger causality test statistics for individual banks and for the whole panel data. As regards the results, we found that the lead-lag relationship between these highly related variables varies over time, over different banks, and over economic regimes. The lead of D2D is signifi cantly stronger for banks that are smaller relative to the other banks in the sample, banks in problem countries (PIIGS), after global fi nancial crises, during market turmoil, and for banks with poor credit quality indicated by a high CDS spread. These results and the fact that D2D can be calculated for every bank quoted on the stock exchange suggests that D2D is a promising alternative to the CDS spread in default risk assessment of banks. JEL Classifi cation: G01; G21; G32.
INTRODUCTION
The recent fi nancial turmoil that started from the subprime crises and spread to European banks and ultimately escalated into a sovereign debt crises, has increased interest in the stability of the banking system. The collapse of Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, AIG, and many other fi nancial institutions has raised the question of the market's failure to anticipate the default risk of banks. There is clearly an increasing need for fi nancial stability tools that policy makers could use to detect and possibly prevent such events in the future. The early warning system (EWS) literature has developed models that aim to predict fi nancial crises beforehand, in a given time window, using information from so called crises indicators. These crises indicators are usually motivated In addition, if the bank is located in a 'problem' country or has low credit quality indicated by a high CDS spread, then the lead of distance-to-default over CDS spread is stronger. Also banks with smaller market capitalization than the sample's median have a stronger lead of D2D over CDS spread. This affect is the other way around when the bank is located in the PIIGS countries as the coeffi cient of our double interaction dummy for these characteristics is negative, and highly signifi cant. Moreover, a turmoil month combined with the fact that the bank is located in PIIGS countries or has a high CDS spread has a similar effect on the lead of the D2D.
As CDS markets have been shown to be information effi cient in many studies (Zhang and Zhang, 2013; Blanco, Brennan and Marsh, 2005) , the superior performance of the distance-todefault over the CDS spread in indicating changes in default risk of banks has to be due to the theoretical background of this measure. In addition to our promising results for the distance-todefault, the fact that the D2D's assumptions have been shown to be quite robust to deviations (Jessen and Lando, 2015) makes this default risk measure a very good alternative to the most commonly used market based early warning indicator. As the D2D is also available for a much broader range of banks and not only the largest ones, the D2D is also a better measure from a practical point of view. Other variables such as equity price (Acharya and Johnson, 2007) and the average overnight borrowing spread (AOR) (Tolo, Jokivuolle and Viren, 2015) have also been shown to lead the CDS spread 3 ; however, this is so far the only study that we know of where a variable has been shown to have predictive power over the future values of the CDS spread by as much as one or two months before the actual realizations of the CDS price.
This paper is organized as follows: in sections 2 and 3 we discuss the calculation and specifi cs of distance-to-default and CDS spread as a default risk measure. In section 4, the dataset for empirical analysis is introduced. Section 5 explains the empirical methodology used in the paper to study the relationship between the two measures. The empirical results and their economic implications are also discussed in the same section. Finally section 6 provides a conclusion.
DISTANCE-TO-DEFAULT
Distance-to-default is a default risk measure derived from Merton (1974) theoretical credit risk model, which treats a fi rm's equity E as a call option on the fi rm's assets A. This means that equity holders obtain the rest of the value of assets after bondholders have received their debt D at the maturity T of the debt. This way the equity value can be presented as E = max (A -D,0) . Distance-to-default is simply the distance between the expected value of assets A and the default point, which is the value of debt D. In other words, the fi rm is expected to default if its assets fall below the level of the debt.
From the D2D formula in the equation 1 one can see that a lower leverage ratio gives a higher D2D value, when other parameters are kept unchanged. The same effect occurs with a higher expected return of assets. The higher volatility of assets increases the value of the D2D when the numerator of the equation 1 is positive. This makes sense as we would expect the likelihood of a default for a more leveraged fi rm to be higher. Moreover, when the fi rm's expected growth of assets has risen, then the likelihood that it can pay its debts must be higher. Intuitively the 124 124 more volatile the returns are, the more likely it is that the assets will fall below the debt level. The critical assumptions of the model are that:
• debt is homogeneous with maturity T • there are no market frictions • fi rm's capital structure is A = D + E • fi rm's asset value A follows a geometric Brownian motion dA t = μA t dt + σ A dS t , where μ is the drift of the asset value and S is a standard Brownian motion • Economic agents are also assumed to be risk neutral, which makes the estimation much simpler as μ can be replaced with the risk-free rate r in formula 1.
The problem within the formula is that we cannot observe the value of the assets A or their volatility σ A . However, due to the option interpretation of the fi rm's equity, we can present the value of the fi rm's equity at time t with the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing formula:
here 2
The unobservable asset value and its volatility can be solved from the system of nonlinear equations consisting of the equation 2 and the relationship between asset and equity volatility in the equation 3. Before we can obtain the asset value and volatility, we must collect the debt value from the fi rm's balance sheet, the risk-free rate, and the equity value and volatility from the stock price data. One of the most often used application of D2D is Moody's KMV method where the debt maturity T is set as 1 year and the debt variable is constructed as the sum of short term debt and one half of the long term debt. This is justifi ed by historical data from KMV's default database, which indicates that typically fi rms default when the asset are somewhere between the total debt and the short term debt (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) . This is also the method used in this paper.
The calculation of the distance-to-default for banks has few problems, when compared to nonfi nancial fi rms. Firstly fi nancial regulators usually take action before the actual default occurs, because of the considerable effect bank defaults have on the economy, due to the collapse of the credit supply. Sy and Chan-Lau (2006) introduced a modifi ed measure called distance-to-capital, which corrects the leverage ratio of D2D with the statutory minimum capital adequacy ratio. The other more severe problem with the banks D2D derivation is the divergence of a fi nancial fi rm's balance sheet from that of a non-fi nancial fi rm. Banks have different kinds of deposits, derivative liabilities, and trading liabilities in their balance sheets. It is hard to defi ne the maturity of these liabilities. In this paper, we use a capital adequacy ratio of 12% to correct the leverage ratio and we defi ne deposits as short term debt and exclude derivative and trading liabilities 4 .
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
Credit default swaps (CDS) are usually used as protection from credit risk. If an investment bank wants to hedge from the default risk of a corporation whose 5-year maturity bond is held by the bank, the bank can buy a 5-year maturity CDS contract from a third party. These CDS contracts are usually traded in over-the counter (OTC) markets. Then the bank pays annual fees to the CDS seller in exchange for the repayment of the rest of the debt, if a default occurs before the maturity of the bond. This annual fee is referred to as the CDS price or CDS spread, which is expressed in basis points. The payments to the seller are usually made more frequently e.g. quarterly. If the corporation does not default during these fi ve years, then the seller keeps the annual fees as profi t from the default risk he/she has borne on behalf of the bank. If a default occurs before the maturity of the CDS contract, then the seller keeps the fees he/she has collected from the buyer and compensates the credit loss to the bank. This compensation is usually done by physically delivering a reference asset or by a cash settlement. Because of the full protection the buyer of the CDS receives against the credit risk of the reference entity, there is a very close relationship between the CDS price and the bond spread 5 . This relationship has been investigated in numerous papers (Blanco et al., 2005) , because of the possible arbitrage opportunity between the two fi nancial instruments. In addition to hedging from credit risk, CDS spreads are also used as early warning indicators of the weak state of the bank. A rapid decline in the bank's creditworthiness raises the CDS spread, as the insurer of the reference entity or the seller of the CDS will demand a larger fee against the greater risk that he/she has to compensate for against the credit losses of the CDS buyer. It is possible to extract default probabilities from the CDS spread as it is seen as a function of the default probability and the recovery value. This recovery value is usually assumed to be a constant, but Duffi e (1999) have stressed that this assumption is not correct in all circumstances. There are few aspects why the CDS spread might not entirely refl ect the bank's credit risk. Firstly, the very popular post-2008 research subject of bank's that are too-big-to-fail. Vlz and Wedow (2011) found that the CDS spreads of large banks are distorted, because they are thought as too-big-to-fail. This might affect the CDS spread in a downgrading way. Secondly the liquidity of a CDS contract may have an effect on the price. The results in the papers investigating the direction of this effect are mixed, but a higher liquidity is usually expected to lower the CDS price. Lastly, the restructuring of the debt is also seen as a default event for CDS contracts in Europe. This means that a cheapest-to-deliver option is also included in the CDS spread, because a physical settlement can be done with some reference entities with discounts.
DATA DESCRIPTION
The monthly dataset used in this paper is from January 2006 to December 2013 and includes 37 large European banks. Originally, we had balance sheet data for over 90 banks, but the ones that were not listed had to be omitted, because stock prices are needed to calculate the distanceto-default. The list of banks were also reduced, because the CDS transaction data was available for an even smaller subset. We used monthly credit default swap spreads that were averaged over daily transaction prices from Datastream. The CDSs used in the analysis are senior fi ve year contracts that is by far the most liquid traded maturity. The data started for some banks as early as 2003, but the majority could only be collected as late as 2008 or even later. Because of this, the number of monthly observations varies across the banks from 42 to 96, so that the total number of observations was 3023. The variables that were needed to calculate the monthly distance-to-default were mainly assembled from Macrobond. The market capitalization averaged from daily observations was used as the value of the equity and the annualized volatility calculated with a 12 month rolling window from daily stock returns as the volatility of equity. Annual balance sheet data 6 was collected from Bankscope and used with the same value for all months of that year. Semi-annual or quarterly data would have been available for a large portion of the banks, but only for the last two or three years. Annual balance sheet data might be an issue, because the other variables have new information on a daily frequency, which is then aggregated to a monthly frequency. This problem would in all likelihood appear as large movements in the distance-to-default value at every January when the new information replaces the assumed old information of the later months of that year. We did not observe this kind of general behaviour in the values, so we proceeded to further analysis with the same data. The debt variable of a bank is the sum of the short term (< 1 year) debt and one half of the long term debt (> 1 year).
The conditional dummy variables used in the panel VAR analysis were divided into the general market condition dummies and bank specifi c characteristic dummies. The former group consists of dummies for different crises periods and of a market turmoil variable. The turmoil dummy is constructed from information from the ITRAXX, which is an index of CDS spreads for large European fi nancial fi rms. The turmoil dummy is equal to one for the months when the index is above its sample median. The bank specifi c characteristic variables are derived in the same manner. The high CDS spread is equal to one when the bank has a higher CDS spread than the median of that months CDS spread among the banks. The high liabilities to equity ratio dummy is equal to one if bank has a higher value than the sample median. The bank size variable is constructed in the same way by using banks' market capitalizations. The bank default information used to assemble the bank default variable was mainly collected from Failed Bank Tracker 7 , which lists bank bailouts, nationalizations, mergers, bankruptcies, defaults etc.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
As both CDS spread and D2D are measures of default risk, then despite the presence of some short-term deviations they should be highly related to each other. Figure 3 displays a heatmap of simple correlation coeffi cients for each bank individually calculated with a fi ve year rolling window. As the decline of D2D and the rise of the CDS spread should indicate an elevated default risk of a bank, then the correlation between the two variables should be negative. It seems that for about half of the banks this is the case most of the time, but interestingly, for many banks there seems to exist a high positive correlation between the two measures for certain time periods. For the banks that have this unexpected result, the correlation seems to be positive for only the beginning of the sample and after that the correlation changes to slightly negative or becomes close to zero. This means that for some banks the measures indicate a change in the default risk in opposite directions.
These correlation coeffi cients could be explained by the D2D theoretical background, which is designed to indicate weaknesses in the bank's balance sheet. The rise of the default risk indicated by a declined D2D value for a bank can either be due to a risen leverage, smaller expected asset returns or higher asset volatility 8 . All of these things should also be refl ected in the CDS prices at some level as well. As the negative relation between the indicated default risk by the 6 Deposits, short term liabilities and long term liabilities excluding derivative and trading liabilities. two measures is strong in the beginning of the sample for some banks, the banks balance sheet information could be more important during times of crises. This was seen during the start of the global fi nancial crises as it became clear that the subprime mortgages banks held in their balance sheet were signifi cantly more risky that was generally thought. Throughout the market turmoil it became increasingly important to know the exact content of a bank's balance sheet and especially exactly how much of the toxic mortgages each bank owned. In addition, the markets did not see the banks' high leverage ratios as a major problem before the crises. From the individual bank graphs of the two measures in Figure A1 it can be concluded that for most of the banks it has been exactly the case that the D2D 'warned' about a risen default risk before the actual eruption of the fi nancial crisis, when the CDS spread indicated the opposite development.
Figure 3
Correlation of D2D and CDS spread calculated with a 5 year rolling window One explanation for the different indications of the measures might also be that sometimes D2D signals default risk changes too eagerly, for example, when banks are merged together and the balance sheet structure rapidly changes. However, this can not explain the signifi cant amount of positive correlation between the measures in the sample. Possibly the markets do not see the balance sheet structure of certain banks as weak as the D2D does. These claims receive some support from the fact that eight of the nine banks that have defaulted in our sample since the fi nancial crises have the expected very high negative correlation between the two measures, which indicates that both the D2D and the CDS spread have either indicated a risen default risk or not -in another words, the measures have agreed on the state of these banks at some level. Nevertheless, the bank's CDS spread and the D2D seem to be highly related.
In order to study a possible long-term relationship between the two measures, we tested for cointegration of the series at the panel level. An individual constant without a trend was assumed for the series in the test specifi cation. A linear trend in a default risk measure would be quite counter intuitive, although this can be detected in some of the individual bank graphs as our sample starts from the beginning of the market turmoil of the subprime crises and ranges through the European sovereign debt crises when the default risks of European banks were generally rising ( Figure 2 ). All of our panel unitroot tests reject the null hypothesis of a unitroot in the D2D series at a 1% signifi cance level, but the tests do not reject the null hypothesis for the CDS spread series. From a theoretical point of view, it would be hard to see why either of the measures would be nonstationary in general. A stochastic trend in the series would indicate that the credit risk for each bank would just rise or decline to infi nity in the long-run, and all the banks would either go bankrupt or have a zero probability for default. Here we exercised some judgement, and conclude that CDS spreads are stationary at panel level given the theoretical and intuitive reasons mentioned earlier. These test results prevented us from using cointegration analysis in the panel setting.
However, we are more interested in the performance of the CDS spread and the D2D in the default risk assessment than their long-term relationship, which is why we will analyse the shortterm dynamics between the two measures with conventional Granger causality analysis in the vector autoregression (VAR) framework. In this way, we can possibly state that the other measure performs better in the sense that it leads the other measure. If this kind of relationship is detected, then we can conclude that the other measure indicated the change in default risk earlier than the other. The formal defi nition of the model used is:
where vector α i represents the fi xed bank effects, matrix A p holds the coeffi cients of the panel regression, t i f is the error term and fi nally vector y t i contains the CDS spread and distance-todefault for bank i at month t. With the fi xed bank effects we can control for the unobserved heterogeneity of each bank. The model has been estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) as it has been shown to give consistent estimators for dynamic panel models with macroeconomic data where T is large and N is relatively small (Juessen and Linnemann, 2010) . We used heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent standard errors by Arellano (1987) in the inference.
Distance-to-default is the so called "challenger" in our analysis as the CDS spread is a more commonly accepted and widely used measure for a bank's default risk. Both of these measures are market based, but the theoretical background might give D2D an advantage over the CDS spread in assessing default risk. Given this motivation we tested the hypothesis 1 in our VAR-framework. Table 2 shows the results for the panel VAR model with fi xed bank effects for two different lag lengths. We report the results for a short-term (S-T) lead-lag relation of one month, and also for a possible long-term (L-T) relation were the lag length was chosen to be two months by the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) from a maximum of 10 months. For robustness of the results we also report the same analysis for the differenced variables in Table A5 , where SBIC chose a lag length of one month. Almost all coeffi cients are statistically signifi cant and have the expected sign. Because a rising default risk of a bank should decrease the D2D and raise its CDS spread, the lagged D2D should have a negative coeffi cient in the CDS equation of the VAR model and vice versa. Only the variables that are lagged by two months in the CDS equation have the opposite signs against intuition. Neither of the variables seem to have predictive information on the value of the D2D two months ahead, as those coeffi cients are not statistically signifi cant in the L-T CDS equation. Both models fi t well as the coeffi cient of determination is the same for the S-T and L-T models -95.3% for the D2D and 96.9% for the CDS spread equation. The fact that the CDS spread is a price given in basis points and the distance-to-default is a value of how many standard deviations away a possible default is, makes a nonlinear relation between the two measures a justifi able alternative that needed to be tested. Quadratic and cubic formulations were fi tted, but the quadratic coeffi cients were not signifi cant and none of the nonlinear model specifi cations improved the models fi t 9 , which is why we followed the assumption of a linear relationship in further analysis. The short term results are consistent with the hypothesis 1, as the null hypothesis that the D2D does not Granger cause CDS spread is rejected at a 1% signifi cance level. However, there seems to be a bidirectional Granger causality, as the null hypothesis of the CDS spread not Granger causing the D2D is also rejected with a 5% signifi cance level. The results are similar with the differenced variables except that we observed a unidirectional Granger causality from the D2D to the CDS spread. With the longer lag length the evidence is even stronger as we could not reject the null for the CDS not leading the D2D, but we reject the null of the D2D not leading the CDS spread at 1% signifi cance level. It seems that at least the D2D has predictive power over the future values of a bank's CDS spread as early as one to two months before the realization of the current value of the CDS spread.
Hypothesis 1.

D2D leads the CDS spread for European banks in the form of Granger causality
As we can accept hypothesis 1 with rather strong evidence, it would be interesting to see if the lead of the D2D over the CDS spread is stronger given certain general market conditions. Figure 4 displays the value and signifi cance of the lagged D2D coeffi cient in the CDS spread equation when the model is estimated with levels and a three year rolling window. The lead of the D2D over the CDS spread seems to become more negative -in other words stronger -throughout the European debt crisis. The D2D theoretical background seems to have provided a major advantage over just using market information in the latter years of the ongoing crises. If there is major time heterogeneity in the D2D coeffi cient, the strength of the lead might also vary between different banks. Table A4 displays the results of the Granger causality analysis for different banks. Again we allowed the VAR-model to choose the lag length from a maximum of 10 months. In the case of 30 banks, a lag length of one month was chosen for the model, but interestingly for 6 banks a lag length of two months was chosen. For 20 banks an unidirectional causality is observed, when 131 131 a 5 % signifi cance level is used to reject the null hypothesis. In half of these cases the D2D leads the CDS spread, which again indicates that the strength of the lead might vary across different bank characteristics. For example, the domicile of seven of these ten banks where the D2D leads the CDS spread is in the so called PIIGS countries. In further analysis, we tested whether the strength of D2D lead depends on some specifi c market or bank condition by adding conditional dummy variable interaction terms with the D2D to the panel VAR model. The S-T model was used as the L-T model did not have a better fi t, and because we wanted to use the simplest model possible. The formal defi nition of the model estimated is: CDS i,t = α 0,i + β 1 CDS i,t-1 + β 2 D2D i,t-1 + β 3 D2D i,t-1 DUMMY i,t-1 . Due to our data limitations we assembled a group with fi ve conditional dummies for bank specifi c characteristics, and four conditional dummies describing general market conditions in order to test the hypothesis 2i -2vi. The results in Table 3 show that the lead was signifi cantly weaker before the global fi nancial crises as the coeffi cient β 3 for the Pre-Lehman dummy interaction with the lagged D2D was negative and highly statistically signifi cant. The lagged D2D coeffi cient β 2 in each model specifi cation was negative and signifi cant as expected, except for the fi rst regression.
Hypothesis 2. The lead of distance-to-default on credit default swap spreads is stronger i) during crises times ii) during market turmoil iii) for more leveraged banks iv) for banks in problem countries v) for banks with poor credit quality vi) for relatively small banks
This simply means that the decline of the distance-to-default raises the CDS prices in the next month. The regressions with the Post-Lehman, European debt crises and the turmoil dummy interaction terms show that the lead also becomes signifi cantly more negative during fi nancial crises -especially the fi rst two years -and during the market turmoil, which is indicated by the high values of the European fi nancial ITRAXX index. When the crises interaction dummy terms are included concurrently in the model with the turmoil interaction term, the Euro Crises coeffi cient stops being signifi cant, but the Post Lehman interaction remains negative and signifi cant together with the turmoil interaction coeffi cient. Given these results we can accept hypothesis 2 i) -ii) of a stronger lead of the D2D over the CDS spread during times of crises and market turmoil. The results for the bank specifi c characteristics are reported in Table 4 . High leverage, bank size, domicile in a 'problem' country, and a high default risk are the characteristics we tested for a possible amplifying effect of the D2D lead. We also tested whether the fact that a bank has since been defaulted would also strengthen the lead or not. This variable of course overlaps the PIIGS dummy in a sense that many of the defaulted banks (except for three) are located in these countries. However, not all banks in PIIGS countries defaulted, which is why we wanted to test whether the lead is related to 'bad' banks or problem countries. The high CDS spread dummy of course proxies a 'bad' bank effect, but it differs from the bank default dummy in a sense that the latter indicates a realized 'bad state' of a bank and the former represents the market's opinion of the banks state. When entered individually into the regression, only being domiciled in PIIGS countries, a high default risk indicated by the CDS spread, and whether the bank was one of those that defaulted during the sample period have a statistically signifi cant strengthening effect on the lead of D2D. The bank's leverage does not seem to have any signifi cant effect on the lead, but the coeffi cient of the bank size becomes highly signifi cant when all the interactions are introduced into the model at the same time. Because the bank size coeffi cient is positive, the lead of the D2D is stronger for banks that have a smaller market capitalization than the sample's median market capitalization. All the other interaction coeffi cients remained almost the same and with the same signifi cance. To conclude, the D2D would have been extremely useful if it had been used in the default risk assessment of a relatively small bank in the PIIGS countries with a high CDS spread during the market turmoil. Overall, we can conclude with rather robust evidence that the hypothesis 2 iv) -vi) hold absolutely, but we have to reject the 2 iii) hypothesis. We continued the analysis after these promising results for the distance-to-default by introducing double interactions for the most promising dummy variables with the lagged D2D variable into the VAR-model. Again the coeffi cient of the lagged D2D is negative for all model specifi cations and signifi cant for all models except one. Turmoil on the market combined with a high CDS spread or a domicile in the PIIGS countries seems to have a signifi cantly amplifying effect on the performance of the D2D relative to CDS spreads. The coeffi cient for the bank size double interaction with a PIIGS domicile is also highly signifi cant and negative. It seems that there is a lead-lag relationship between the two default risk measures that varies between bank characteristics and general market conditions. The most robust results were that the lead of the distance-to-default over CDS prices is signifi cantly stronger during market turmoil and fi nancial crises, for banks in problem countries, and for banks with high CDS spreads. This promising performance of distance-to-default relative to CDS spreads in default risk assessment of European banks can be due to several factors that we can only speculate on here. A relevant issue that needs to be addressed is the share each D2D's component explains of the measures variation. Because stock returns seem to be much more volatile than the liabilities in the banks' balance sheet, it might be that the changes in the values of the D2D -and thus its lead over the CDS spread -is mainly due to the movements in stock prices. To check this possibility, we regressed D2D with the stock returns, volatility of the returns and the banks' liabilities. Then we calculated the partial coeffi cient of determination for each regressor to see the proportions of explained variance for each variable. The proportions of the explained variance were 15.8% for stock returns, 40.9% for the volatility of returns and 43.3% for the banks liabilities. It seems that the liabilities in bank's balance sheet play a more important role in measuring default risk than is usually thought.
As both measures use market information -one from stock prices and one from CDS prices -the only thing that can affect the difference in performance is the theoretical background of D2D, if we assume that both markets are information effi cient. The derivation of D2D assumes, for example, that there are no market frictions and that the fi rm's asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion, which might not be true all the time. Jessen and Lando (2015) studied the robustness of D2D on deviations from the Merton model assumptions. They found that D2D is a robust measure for ranking different fi rms according to their default risk despite deviations from most of the assumptions, except for large jumps in the asset value process or if it has stochastic volatility. The other possibility for the lead of the D2D, in addition to the theoretical background of this measure, could be some form of information ineffi ciency of the CDS markets in some situations. This could indicate that during crises the number of CDS contracts made would decline, because the evaluation of banks' credit risk would be a harder task for the seller and the buyer of the contract. This decline in transaction volume could affect the price discovery process and the markets would not be as information effi cient, which would give the distanceto-default a further lead over the CDS spreads. Of course the distance-to-default method also uses market data, but this is from the stock markets, which are probably far more liquid and thus more information effi cient 10 . The fact that CDSs are bilateral contracts traded over-the-counter mainly by large institutional investors supports this claim as the CDS markets would be rather 'thin' when compared with stock markets. This kind of ineffi ciency could be tested by CDS trade volume data, which we do not unfortunately poses. However, the CDS markets have been shown to be effi cient in many studies (Zhang and Zhang, 2013; Norden and Weber, 2004 ) and a lead of one month due to market ineffi ciency would be quite hard to believe, which is why we have to conclude that the theoretical background is most probably the reason for the better performance of the distance-to-default in many situations. Given these results it is quite interesting to look at the values of the two measures of the individual bank graphs in fi gure A1. The right axis displays the negative of the D2D and the left axis shows the bank's CDS spread in basis points. If the two measures indicate the same direction of default risk change, then these two lines should go hand in hand. From many of the individual bank graphs it can be seen that around the middle of 2012, the measures seem to move in opposite directions. For almost every individual graph the CDS spread seem to start declining rapidly, which is probably the result of the European central bank president Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes to preserve the euro" speech that calmed the markets. However for the majority of the banks the D2D does not decline as it stays as high as before or begins to rise.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have studied the correlation and short-term dynamics between the CDS spread and the distance-to-default measure for large European banks. In the light of our empirical results from conventional Granger causality analysis in the panel VAR framework, it seems that there is rather robust evidence of a lead-lag relationship between these two highly related default risk measures. In most cases, the lead was one month long, but for some individual banks it was as long as two months. The direction and magnitude of this lead varied with the general market conditions, the banks domicile country, and the bank specifi c characteristics. The individual bank results were very heterogeneous as there were the same number of banks where the distance-todefault leads CDS spreads and banks where the Granger causality was the other way around. The lead of the distance-to-default seems to become stronger and more signifi cant the further away it is from the beginning of the global fi nancial crises. The market turmoil indicated by a high fi nancial CDS ITRAXX index, a banks domicile in the so called PIIGS countries, and a low credit quality proxied by a high CDS spread has the same strengthening effect on the lead of D2D. The results regarding banks' relative size when compared to the rest of the banks in the sample were mixed as bank size by itself seemed to lower the lead signifi cantly, but when the bank was also in a problem country the effect was the reverse and highly signifi cant.
The promising performance of distance-to-default relative to CDS spread can be motivated by the distance-to-default's theoretical background combined with market information and balance sheet data. The better performance of D2D, especially during market turmoil and fi nancial crises, might indicate that balance sheet information will become increasingly relevant during such market conditions. This was clearly the case during the fi rst stages of the global fi nancial crises of 2008, when the markets were thrown into a panic, as no one knew exactly how many of the toxic subprime mortgages each bank had on their balance sheets. As the more commonly used default risk measure CDS spread relies solely on market information; however, these results imply that a measure with a theoretical background such as the D2D should be used together with the leading market based measure. Using D2D in this way might be very useful in a sense, because it might signal weaknesses in a bank's balance sheet earlier than the CDS spread. The fact that the CDS spread is available for a subset of banks and the D2D can in practice be computed for all banks that are traded on the stock exchange, makes the latter a good alternative as an early warning indicator for the default risk of individual banks. D2D seems to be a good measure for combining information from market prices and balance sheet components. The use of this kind of measure might be a better option for default risk assessment than just using market price data or banks' balance sheet data alone. A further aspects of the subject that could be researched would be the possible generalization of these results. For example, the question could be: Do these relationships between D2D and CDS spreads hold true for banks everywhere or just in Europe and for this time span? It would also be interesting to replicate this analysis e.g. for banks in the U.S. and Asia. 
